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Another sneak peek at Brexit book ‘Will 
the Tory Party Ever Be the Same?: The 
Effect of Brexit’ 
The fourth book in our Bite-Size book series ‘Will the Tory Party Ever 
Be the Same?: The Effect of Brexit’ has now been published and is 
available for you to enjoy! We’re celebrating by giving you a sneak 
peek at a selection of writing from many of the book’s contributors. 
‘Will the Tory Party Ever Be the Same?: The Effect of Brexit’, edited 
by John Mair, Paul Davies and Neil Fowler, provides insights and 
different perspectives on a really important political question. The UK 
is in turmoil; Parliament in chaos and the Tories left facing several 
directions at the same time. Will they survive? 
The book boats a wide variety of contributors, including Sir John 
Redwood, Damian Green and Lord Heseltine, as well as historian 
Richard Gaunt and distinguished commentators, including Peter 
Hitchens, Matthew D’Ancona, Eben Black and Liz Gerard. 
Check out the other sneak peeks here and here. 
Your sneak peek of Sir John Redwood MP’s chapter… 
The misery of our long-running row is likely to continue 
European policy has overshadowed John Redwood’s life in the 
Conservative Party. He would like a change but isn’t sure that 
will happen 
My adult life in the Conservative Party has been lived with the long 
shadow of European Union policy hanging over us. 
In the 1970s the Conservative Party was strongly in favour of 
the Common Market (the EEC) as it then called it. I remember as a 
young man casting one of my first votes in the 1975 Referendum on 
whether to stay in. I read the Treaty of Rome which was about so 
much more than a common market. I decided I was being lied to by 
those who said it was just a common market with no transfer of 
sovereignty or loss of the rights of self-government and voted against 
remaining in the EEC. 
During the Thatcher years the EEC evolved towards the 
comprehensive economic, political and monetary union we know 
today. As it did so I and others persuaded the Prime Minister that she 
needed to shift from being a keen advocate of the Common Market to 
being a sceptic about the wisdom and desirability of monetary and 
political union for the UK. 
This culminated in her Bruges speech and her clear conversion to 
opposing the single currency and other integration that would follow. 
Out of office she converted to believing we needed to leave the EU 
altogether, as it had become something she could no longer support. 
In the 1990s the government of John Major was destroyed by his 
decision to put the UK economy through the torture of the European 
Exchange Rate Mechanism (the ERM). The adoption of this European 
policy gave us boom and bust. It undermined the Conservative’s hard-
won reputation for good economic management and left voters 
disillusioned by the loss of jobs and the economic damage done to 
them. 
The story line was written by the incoming Labour government, which 
attributed Conservative unpopularity to the splits in the party over the 
ERM and over the Maastricht Treaty for monetary union. The polls 
show a different story. It was the economic damage of the ERM that 
turned most of the voters off, with a pronounced collapse in support 
when we were forced out of the mechanism, support which was never 
recovered. 
The public understood the Government had backed a major EU 
economic policy which had gone horribly wrong, and wished to punish 
those who had made such a bad misjudgement. The ERM experience 
forced the Government to lie, with endless statements that the ERM 
was working and we would never leave it. 
The markets knew better and forced us out before more damage was 
done. 
When the Government had to swallow all its words of the ERM era it 
suffered a breakdown in trust in anything it said. Nicholas Ridley and I 
were lone voices in government against the ERM fiasco, though I 
forecast what was likely to happen accurately. Just before joining that 
ill-fated government I had written a pamphlet explaining how the ERM 
would lead to boom and bust. 
In opposition the Conservatives had a big internal party battle over our 
attitude towards the Euro. John Major fought to keep open the option 
of the UK joining before he left office. A succession of leaders in 
opposition, struggling to regain the Conservative reputation for 
economic competence, allied with the big majority of the party who 
were against sacrificing the pound. 
I and others made the case that the Euro was the ERM you could not 
get out of. The Euro, like the ERM, was bound to cause boom and 
bust, as it duly did for Ireland, Spain, Cyprus and other members. 
We pointed out the Euro was always very unpopular with UK voters, 
who intuitively understood that those who control the money control 
the management. Leaders found it was possible to unite most MPs 
and party members around opposition to the Euro and opposition to a 
succession of centralising EU treaties. 
The party voted against acceptance of the Treaties of Nice, 
Amsterdam and Lisbon. The Labour government sought to mislead 
the public by claiming these treaties were technical tidying up 
exercises of little significance. They were instead major transfers of 
power from the UK and the other member states to the EU. They 
removed many a veto over particular policies and laws, allowing the 
EU to emerge as a principal legislator and effective government in 
many areas of life. 
We demonstrated that the party could come together with few 
dissenters around a platform of opposing more transfers of power to a 
power-hungry Brussels. 
Tories back in power 
In 2010 the Conservatives were finally returned to office. The collapse 
of the economy and damage done to the banking system in 2007-9 
was considerably worse than the damage done by the ERM, with a 
deeper recession. This undermined support for the Labour 
government that presided over it and gave the Conservatives a 
chance again. 
The problem of Europe however still loomed large. Although by this 
time there was clear cross-party support for not joining the Euro, the 
incoming Conservative government found many of its powers had 
been given away to the EU in treaties we had opposed in opposition. 
For many Conservative MPs and party members this was an 
unacceptable position. Our Parliamentary system rests on the 
principle that one Parliament cannot bind a future Parliament. A 
newly-elected government should be able to change some of the laws 
and policies of its predecessor, because the public has voted them in 
to change things. In all too many areas this was no longer possible, as 
the overarching treaties and the cat’s cradle of regulations, directives 
and controls from the EU greatly circumscribed the government’s 
actions. 
The Prime Minister was relaxed about the extent of EU control, and 
tried to tell his party that unfortunately the Treaty of Lisbon had been 
implemented before he arrived so we could not roll it back. 
Many MPs and party members urged him to offer a referendum on 
whether we should stay in the EU at all, as it was clear to both sides 
in the argument that the only way the UK could be freed of the Lisbon 
Treaty was to leave the EU itself. 
The argument continued within the parliamentary party until Mr 
Cameron conceded a referendum promise for the next Conservative 
manifesto and election campaign. He made this offer at the point 
where disillusion with his leadership had reached high levels within 
the parliamentary party. 
Eurosceptics demonstrated their growing strength by voting against 
the government on European matters in large numbers. As the group 
approached support from half the party the Prime Minister understood 
the arithmetic and made the concession. He saw off a possible no 
confidence vote in himself as leader. 
Ukip claimed the credit, but my view is the pressure that mattered 
came from Conservative MPs determined to have a leader who 
offered a referendum. We also thought it would be popular with the 
public and would help the Conservatives win an overall majority. The 
presence of Liberal Democrats in coalition between 2010 and 2015 
ensured a more pro-EU stance to government than most 
Conservatives wanted. 
In 2015 the Conservatives won the election, as I and other 
Eurosceptics thought given the promise of the Referendum. A rather 
surprised leadership of the party had been preparing for another 
coalition government, with the Lib Dems exercising a veto over the 
Referendum plan. 
Mr Cameron rightly understood he had to honour this central eye-
catching pledge, and undertook the Referendum legislation in good 
time near the start of the Parliament. 
He realised that he would have more chance of winning the vote if he 
had carried out a successful renegotiation of the UK position. He 
toured the capitals of the EU member states to see what they would 
offer to help the UK. He was told they would offer very little. He made 
very modest requests for improvement, centred around more control 
of our own benefits system for payments to migrants. He failed to 
deliver on the issues he had identified and seemed shocked by the 
very negative response to his ‘deal’ among Conservative MPs on his 
return from Brussels. 
He and his Chancellor and political adviser George Osborne still 
assumed Remain would win despite the reversal they suffered in the 
negotiations with the EU. They refused to countenance any 
government planning for a Leave win. The Government decided to be 
very partisan in the Referendum, and helped create the tone of the 
Remain campaign. 
A negative battle 
It was remorselessly negative, based around a series of threats and 
pessimistic forecasts of what would happen if we dared to leave. 
There was little about why the EU was a good thing, and little about 
what gains we could make in future from membership. There was a 
complete denial about political and monetary union. They wished to 
present the EU as if it were still a grand common market, as if the 
relentless pressure towards full monetary and political union did not 
exist. 
When they lost the Referendum both the Prime Minister and the 
Chancellor, who had been such prominent Remain figures, resigned. 
Mr Cameron broke his promise to send the letter notifying the EU of 
our intention to depart the day after the vote, beginning an agonising 
process of delays to the proper pursuit of our exit which came to 
characterise the next two years and nine months. 
The party wanted to elect a Leave supporting MP, but the leadership 
election failed to produce two candidates for the party in the country to 
choose between. The parliamentary party chose Mrs May who had 
been a Remain supporter. A tension grew between the party in the 
country with very strong support for Leave, and the parliamentary 
party with a majority of Remain voters. A small number of these 
Remain MPs did not accept the result of the Referendum and set 
about using every parliamentary technique to try to delay, water down 
or even stop Brexit. Three of them eventually left the party to join the 
new Independent Group of former Labour MPs who also wanted to 
cancel Brexit. 
As I write this I cannot tell what the end will be. If Mrs May succeeds 
in taking us out, without signing the Withdrawal Agreement, the party 
in the country will be happy and the Conservatives are likely to go up 
in the polls. If Mrs May ends up delaying Brexit and extending the long 
arguments over what kind of Brexit and what kind of close future 
partnership with the EU we should a buy, the misery of the European 
rows will continue. 
Will the Tory Party Ever Be the Same?: The Effect of Brexit is 
available NOW in Paperback and Digitally on Amazon here. 
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